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Digital Asset Recovery and the Unique Challenges posed by Decentralised Autonomous Organisations ("DAOs")

Never come across the term Decentralised Autonomous Organisation ("DAO") before? You’re not alone, but as of 13 January 2025, these virtual organisations held over US $32.2 billion in digital asset value on monitored blockchains (1) and represent the next frontier in digital asset recovery.

Nia Statham

What is a DAO?

Sometimes described as “companies of the future”, DAOs are virtual associations of anonymous2 token holders which operate on a decentralised and open-source blockchain ledger. In ethos, they are intended to be highly democratised structures with no executive control and autonomous, in the sense that they are governed at their inception by code which is written into self-executing smart contracts deployed on the blockchain.  

Generally speaking, DAOs will share a publicly viewable un-hosted wallet secured by a private key that can require multiple signatories to authorise withdrawals. This un-hosted (multi-sig) wallet (Treasury Wallet) is akin to the DAO’s bank account and can hold hundreds of millions of dollars in digital assets (Treasury Assets). DAOs may (amongst other things) also utilise sub-Treasury Wallets to segregate its digital assets and, if it has adopted an intermediary corporate vehicle to “legally wrap” itself (discussed below), may purchase real world assets or interests in other companies, and have bank accounts and/or accounts with providers that offer crypto-fiat exchange services (which include centralised cryptocurrency exchanges) opened on its behalf. 

Decisions with respect to how the Treasury Assets are managed and transferred away from the DAO fall to those who hold the DAO’s “governance” tokens. These tokens give the holder voting rights with respect to proposals3 that are put to the DAO; voting thresholds will be bespoke to each DAO. As such, a DAO may be unable to transfer its Treasury Assets until a proposal is passed.  

To achieve a democratised structure, governance tokens should be distributed across a large pool of individual token holders (which has the effect of diluting voting power). However, governance tokens can be disproportionately allocated to numerous anonymous un-hosted wallet addresses (which can be controlled by the same person or a consortium of persons) at a DAO’s inception, and this has the effect of “centralising” a DAO’s token supply. Governance tokens can also be purchased in advance of being issued and traded on dApps, decentralised and centralised exchanges.  

The objectives and parameters of each DAO can vary from fundraising for social and charitable causes (in which case holders waive the prospect of redeeming their tokens for value), to behaving closer to decentralised venture capital funds for start-ups (whereby tokens producing yields are issued and can be traded for value).  

Asset recovery challenges

Legitimate industry protects itself from the risks posed by bad actors who wish to abuse legal wrappers by (amongst other things) utilising responsible directors, and deploying sophisticated governance and security protocols. However, the utilisation of legal wrappers which do not identify those behind a centralised DAO or a decentralised project with a centralised token supply, provides scope to conceal the real identities of sophisticated bad actors which may be raising funds for seemingly legitimate projects, with the ultimate aim of transferring those assets away for illicit purposes.  

Particular challenges with respect to enforcing a Court Order for the purposes of safeguarding Treasury Assets and appointing receivers or liquidators to a DAO’s Treasury Wallet also arise due to several factors. For example, controllers of the legal wrapper (such as the directors) will unlikely exert any meaningful control over the DAO’s Treasury Wallet unless they are the sole signatory and can control the outcome of a proposal (should one need to be passed in line with the DAO’s protocol). 

In any other case, the real identities and service details of the signatories to the Treasury Wallet must be located, as they will need to authorise any Court ordered transfer. Additionally, the DAO’s token holders may also need to pass a proposal to authorise a Court ordered transfer of the DAO’s Treasury Assets to a secured third party custodian wallet (for ringfencing purposes). However, this may be difficult to achieve should the DAO’s token holders simply refuse to pass a proposal or where the DAO has been abandoned.  

Applying for third-party disclosure relief to obtain the KYC on the beneficial owner of accounts registered to ownerless companies (or legal wrappers who are beneficially held by ownerless companies) with, for example, fiat-cryptocurrency exchange service providers (including centralised cryptocurrency exchanges) may also have limited tracing value. This is because non-membership information (for the legal wrapper or ultimately, its ownerless parent company) may be legitimately accepted in the alternative as good KYC.7 Under those circumstances, such fiat-cryptocurrency service providers (of which some operate in jurisdictions that regulate centralised cryptocurrency exchanges) may give rise to similar asset tracing and recovery challenges posed by unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges.  

In some cases, it may also be impossible to determine whether any intermediary vehicle (regardless of whether it is ownerless) legally wraps a particular project or DAO as there is currently no requirement to record or disclose this information in an accessible register. As such, where projects and their legal wrappers do not share the same name and a connection between them is not voluntarily disclosed, token holders may find it hard to discern whether the DAO or project they participate in is legally wrapped, where to bring a claim, what statutory rights they may have against the legal wrapper, what other assets that legal wrapper may hold and thus the full recovery paths available to them.  

In addition to the above, there is no requirement to maintain a record (supported by high quality KYC) of who the signatories are to a Treasury Wallet. However, there are legitimate privacy and possibly serious safety concerns for these signatories should their information get into the wrong hands.

Risk round-up

As mentioned above, responsible industry arguably has the necessary experience, tools and safeguards in place to mitigate against the risks of abuse posed by bad actors through the utilisation of legal wrappers generally. However, asset recovery professionals must be alive to the risks posed by these vehicles where they’re abused, since they could easily play a role in the “integration” and “placement” stage of a crypto-fiat laundering process. This is because legal wrappers are another means of off-ramping and on-ramping illicit cryptocurrencies, whether by purchasing real world assets or by opening accounts (including those which facilitate crypto-fiat exchange trades).  

Due to the potential disconnect between those who operate or control a legal wrapper (of which KYC can be provided) and those who can anonymously control a centralised DAO which hosts a high value Treasury Wallet, there is a risk that legal wrappers and ownerless vehicles alike could be exploited by bad actors of a centralised project or DAO to circumvent the usual investigative advantages provided by regulated cryptocurrency exchanges and other providers which require traditional KYC on a corporate client.  

Utilising any legal wrapper in this way (which circumvents the need to disclose who is behind a centralised project or DAO) for the purposes of on-ramping and off-ramping illicit cryptocurrencies can frustrate investigators’ efforts to ascertain the identity of bad actors, and in turn their ability to meaningfully trace and recover a DAO or project’s misappropriated digital assets. 

This article was first published in ThoughtLeaders4 FIRE Magazine • ISSUE 20 76  

Footnotes

1 Private blockchain networks only permit a verified select number of users to access it, this provides a high level of privacy and security which may impact the accuracy of these figures.

2 Whether a token holder can be identifiable will depend on many factors, including how the token was acquired, the source of cryptocurrencies used and how sophisticated any blockchain based laundering methods were utilised before the token’s acquisition.

3 Proposals are akin to resolutions put forward to members of a private company at a general meeting.

4 See Samuels v. Lido DAO, Order re Motion to Dismiss, No. 23-cv-06492 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2024); CFTC v. Ooki DAO, No. 3:22-cv-05416 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2023) (default judgment); and Sarcuni v. bZx DAO, 664 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1117–18 (S.D. Cal. 2023).

5 Foundation Companies are governed by the Foundation Companies Act, 2017. Section 8 permits all shares in a Foundation Company to be cancelled subject to the appointment of a supervisor (whose details are recorded in a register). The supervisor has no economic or beneficial interest in the Foundation Company, and its supervisory powers and duties can be restricted by the Foundation Company’s constitution. A supervisor may also be the Foundation Company’s director.

6 Mantra Dao Inc and Another v. John Patrick Mullin and others [2024] HKCFI 2099.

7 This is because KYC on the controller of the legal wrapper, which could be the director or another office holder who is conferred with statutory stewardship powers, may be
accepted.

Further information

Our team have pioneering experience in the Web3 and Digital Asset Disputes space being first to wind-up a cryptocurrency exchange in the Cayman Islands. We comprehensively advise on Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) as we understand the offshore legal wrappers that DAOs are adopting, their ethos, governance structures, communities and unique features which make them a legal and regulatory novelty.

Find out more about our Web3 & Digital Asset Disputes expertise.